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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
David S. Begley appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The relevant facts and course of proceedings of the underlying case were
outlined by the district court in its order denying motion for summary disposition
and notice of intent to dismiss:
On June 5, 2008, a Grand Jury indicted Begley on three
counts of Lewd Conduct with a Child Under 16 Years of Age in
Case Number CR-2008-16840-C. On March 27, 2009, a Status
Conference was held and a plea agreement was reached between
the State, Begley, and his then attorney Richard L. Harris
(hereinafter, Harris). The State agreed to dismiss all charges in
CR-2008-16840-C, and thereafter, on March 27, 2009 the State
filed a new case, CR-2009-10663-C, against Begley charging him
with one count of Felony Injury to a Child, in violation of I.C. §
18.1501(1).
On March 27, 2009, Begley and Harris completed a Guilty
Plea Advisory form, which included information regarding Begley's
right to be represented by an attorney and that upon request this
Court would appoint an attorney to be paid by the county. Begley
entered an Alford Plea with this Court. Begley stated he was fully
advised of the circumstances of this case. Furthermore, Begley
was notified of the maximum and minimum sentence associated
with this crime. And finally, this Court informed Begley that it was
not bound by any sentencing recommendations offered to the
Court.
On March 27, 2009, this Court ordered a Presentence
Investigation Report, which included a polygraph report, character
reference letters, and a Psychosexual Evaluation.
On June 3, 2009, Begley's counsel filed a Sentencing
Memorandum.
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On June 9, 2009, this Court held a sentencing hearing at
which time one alleged victim and several character witnesses on
behalf of Begley provided testimony. This Court had reviewed the
Presentence Investigation Report. This Court found Begley guilty
of the offense of Felony Injury to Child, I.C. § 18.1501 (1 ), and
sentenced Begley within the law to ten years in the state
penitentiary, one year fixed, nine years indeterminate.
On June 15, 2009, this Court entered a Judgment and
Commitment that Begley had been convicted upon his plea of guilty
to the offense of Injury to Child.
On June 24, 2009, Begley filed a Motion to Correct or
Reduce Sentence Pursuant to Rule 35, ICR.
On June 26, 2009, the State filed its objection to Rule 35
Motion and Request for Hearing.
On July 10, 2009, Begley filed a notice of Appeal.
On October 1, 2009, this Court denied Begley's Motion for
Reduction of Sentence.
On March 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals of the State of
Idaho upheld this Court's judgment and sentence and the order
denying Begley's Rule 35 motion.
(R., pp.80-81 (citations to transcript of change of plea hearing omitted).)
Begley then filed a timely pro se petition and affidavit for post-conviction
relief and a motion and affidavit for the appointment of counsel. (R., pp.2-25.)
The district court appointed counsel to assist Begley in his post-conviction relief
case.

(R., pp.29-31.) The state filed an answer to Begley's initial petition for

post-conviction relief requesting Begley's claim be denied and/or dismissed. (R.,
pp.26-28). Through counsel, Begley filed an amended petition and affidavit in
support of post-conviction relief asserting his "guilty plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily made because the court failed to determine a factual basis for his
Alford plea after [Begley] continued to maintain his innocence" as well as a claim
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of ineffective assistance of counsel with nine separate bases.

(R., pp.36-48.)

The state filed an answer to the amended petition. (R., pp.49-51.) Begley then
filed a motion for summary disposition and supporting brief addressing only the
voluntary nature of his guilty plea. (R., pp.52-53, 60-76.)
The district court issued an order denying Begley's motion for summary
disposition and providing notice of its intent to dismiss. (R., pp.79-86.)

Begley

responded to the notice of intent to dismiss, again only addressing the voluntary
nature of his guilty plea.

(R., pp.87-90.) The district court thereafter filed an

order of dismissal on the grounds set forth in its notice of intent to dismiss. (R.,
pp.92-94.)
Begley timely appealed. (R., pp.95-99.)
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ISSUES

Begley states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr.
Begley's claim that his Alford plea
was not knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily made because the record of his plea
hearing, at which he maintained his innocence, did not contain a
strong factual basis for the charge to which he pied guilty?
2.
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed another
claim raised in Mr. Begley's amended petition for post-conviction
relief without providing notice of the reasons for dismissal?
(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues as follows:
1.

Has Begley failed to show error in the district court's summary
dismissal of his claim that his Alford plea was not knowingly, intelligently
and voluntarily made?

2.

Has Begley failed to establish that he lacked notice of the grounds for
summary dismissal of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for
failing to move to strike information from victims of uncharged crimes from
the presentence investigation report?
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ARGUMENTS

I.
Begley Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief On The Ground That His
Alford Plea Was Not Knowingly, Intelligently And Voluntarily Entered

A

Introduction
Begley asserts the "district court erred when it summarily dismissed a

claim that his Alford plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made
because the record of his plea hearing, at which he maintained his innocence,
did not contain a strong factual basis for the charge to which he pied guilty."
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)

Because the record supports the district court's

conclusion that Begley's plea was knowingly and voluntarily made in addition to
supporting a finding of a strong factual basis for the entry of such a plea,
Begley's argument fails.

8.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted.
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Nellsch v.
State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992).

C.

General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding

and the petitioner bears the
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burden of establishing,

by a

preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho
at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548,
550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint
in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain more than "a short and plain
statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho
at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 8).

The petitioner must submit

verified facts within his personal knowledge and produce admissible evidence to
support his allegations.

kl

(citing I.C. § 19-4903).

Furthermore, the factual

showing in a post-conviction relief application must be in the form of evidence
that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho
612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978
P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative.

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises
no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c));
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.
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While a court must accept a

petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164
P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112
(2001)). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief,
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing
the petition.

kl (citing

Stuartv. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220

(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law."

D.

kl

Begley Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination
That Begley Failed To Present A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Entitling
Him To An Evidentiary Hearing On The Issue Of The Voluntariness Of His
Plea
"Before a trial court accepts a plea of guilty in a felony case, the record

must show that the plea has been made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily,
and the validity of a plea is to be determined by considering all the relevant
circumstances surrounding the plea as contained in the record."

State v.

Ramirez, 122 Idaho 830, 833, 839 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting
State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 297-98, 787 P.2d 281, 283-84 (1990) (citation
omitted). Begley asserts his plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
entered because he maintained his innocence and the record of the entry of his
plea "did not contain a strong factual basis for the charge to which he pleaded
guilty."

(Appellant's brief, p.4.)

Review of the record, which establishes that
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Begley entered the plea to avoid a possible conviction on greater charges, shows
this claim to be without merit
When an Alford plea is entered,
an accused may voluntarily consent to the imposition of a prison
sentence despite a professed belief in his or her innocence, as long
as a factual basis for the plea is demonstrated by the state, and the
accused clearly expresses a desire to enter such a plea. In Idaho,
there is no general obligation to inquire into the factual basis of a
guilty plea. However, such an inquiry should be made if an Alford
plea is accepted, or if the court receives information before
sentencing which raises an obvious doubt as to guilt.
Ramirez, 122 Idaho at 834, 839 P.2d at 1248 (quoting Anderson v. State, 119
Idaho 994,996,812 P.2d 301, 303 (Ct. App. 1991). A factual basis need not be
proven by reasonable doubt, but it is necessary to determine a strong factual
basis exists to ensure the voluntariness of the plea:
By determining that a strong factual basis for the plea exists, the
trial court ensures that the defendant is pleading guilty because he
believes that the state could, and more likely than not would, prove
the charges against him beyond a reasonable doubt; and thus the
defendant is entering the plea knowingly and voluntarily because
he believes it to be in his best interests to do so, despite his
continued assertion of innocence.
Ramirez, 122 Idaho at 834, 839 P.2d at 1248. Desire to take advantage of a
plea agreement is an appropriate basis for entry of an Alford plea. See North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); State v. Jones, 129 Idaho 471, 474,
976 P.2d 1318, 1321 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 927,
854 P.2d 765, 770 (Ct. App. 1993); Odom v. State, 121 Idaho 625, 626-27, 826
P.2d 1337, 1338-39 (Ct. App. 1992). When determining if the requisite factual
basis for the plea exists, an appellate court looks "to the entire record before the
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trial judge at the time the plea was accepted."

&

(citing Fowler v. State, 109

Idaho 1002, 1005, 712 P.2d 703, 706 (Ct. App. 1985).)
Begley was originally charged with three counts of lewd conduct with a
child. (R., p.80.) As his attorney advised the district court at the change of plea
hearing that there had been lengthy plea negotiations to arrive at a plea to a new
charge of injury to child:
Judge, and perhaps I can explain the full ramifications of what has
gone on here.
The court is aware that Mr. Begley took a polygraph test
back in February and he passed the polygraph with reference to the
other charge.
Since then I've had considerable amount of
communication with [the assigned prosecutor].
I've had
conferences with [the elected prosecutor]. I've talked to another
prosecutor about this matter on at least a couple of occasions,
different prosecutors, and where we're at this afternoon is a
compromise by both the state and Mr. Begley.
The compromise is a dismissal of the L and L charge in
return for filing this charge and obtaining Mr. Begley's plea to this
charge of injury to a child.
The compromise on our part is to accept the filing of this
Information and entering a plea to this information. And we are
receiving a benefit by doing that of not having to go to trial on the L
and L charge with the risk - and we discussed that at length. We
have gone back and forth on this with Mr. Begley and Mrs. Begley
with reference to entering a plea to this charge this afternoon.
And what we were really doing here is a number of things:
One is we are ending this matter with a plea. Number two we are
receiving a benefit by not having to go to a jury trial on the L and L
and risk conviction and subsequently having to register as a sex
offender and the stigmatization that goes along with that in the
event that the jury returned a verdict of guilty. And then obviously
there's - we eliminate the cost of trial and the accruing costs of
further legal proceedings in the matter as we proceed.
So with a compromise on the part of the state and a
compromise that we're making, it is our desire this afternoon to
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enter an Alford plea to this charge and take advantage of what the
state has done and eliminate the risk of a potential jury verdict that
may be adverse and that we avoid that.
(3/27/2009 Tr. 1 , p.4, L.16 - p.6, L.4.)

Upon inquiry from the court, the state

provided additional background regarding Begley's charge in terms of what
would happen if Begley were in sex offender treatment for the offense he was
about to enter an Alford plea to:
Judge, I think what's going to happen with Mr. Begley is that
there is going to be a victim's polygraph, but it's not going to be
limited just to these three victims. [Defense counsel] has brought
up quite a bit the polygraph that took place with regard to the
charged victims. There was another polygraph with one of the
uncharged victims which the court ruled could not testify pursuant
to 404 (b) that Mr. Begley actually failed. So that's a huge factor as
to why the state is asking and pushing so hard for him to attend sex
offender treatment as I believe that he would benefit from it,
especially given the fact that there are prior uncharged victims.
That's a huge part of it. And I think that's what SANE Solutions is
going to address. He's going to be facing victim's polygraphs to
make sure there aren't additional victims and make sure that we
have covered and the treatment covers all the possible victims out
there.
(3/27/2009 Tr. p.18, L.24 - p.19, L.16.)
The district court had the benefit of having presided over motion hearings
in the original lewd conduct case in addition to having the information as provided
by the prosecutor about the existence of additional victims and victims' polygraph
examinations as well as Begley's failed polygraph examination in addressing a
victim not charged in the original lewd conduct case. All of these factors played a
part in the amendment of the charges. That background information gave the
1

This transcript of the change of plea hearing was made part of the record on
appeal with the October 4, 2012 order granting motion to augment the record
with "Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Disposition, with
attachments, file-stamped August 5, 2011."
10

district court a strong factual basis for the entry of a guilty plea to injury to child
and led into the following colloquy:
THE COURT:
The Information that's been filed in this case
charges the following offense: That the defendant David Begley on
or between the first day of January 2007, through May 27, 2007, in
the County of Canyon, State of Idaho, did under circumstances
likely to produce great bodily harm or death to a child under 18
years of age, specifically T.C., date of birth
nd/or
A.H., date of birth
unlawfully and willfully caused or
permit the person or health of the child to be injured while having
care or custody of said child.
Now, to that offense do you plead guilty?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
that charge.

Judge, we will enter an Alford plea to

THE COURT:
Well, Mr. Begley, do you plead guilty to this
offense on the basis that you feel like the state has sufficient
evidence that there's a likelihood they could prove their case at
trial?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor, I don't think they can prove it,
butTHE COURT:
Well, here's the situation. My understanding of
the case of Alford versus North Carolina, which is a case decided
by the United States Supreme Court, it essentially stands for the
proposition that a person can plead guilty to a crime even though
they don't believe they're guilty but on the basis that they
understand that the state's evidence is strong enough that they
very well may lose the case at a jury trial.
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
THE COURT:
So I guess what I'm asking you is - I mean,
you've talked to your attorney. And what I heard your attorney say
earlier today is that the risk of losing on three charges of lewd and
lascivious conduct against children is something that you've
weighed in your consideration. Is that fair to say?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
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THE COURT:
So is that why you're then pleading guilty to
this new charge of injury to children?
THE DEFENDANT: If you're asking the reason why I'm pleading is
because of the cost of the jury trial, one. Financially we can't afford
it. Two, it's a flip of a coin, their word versus mine. My attorney
has advised me of that, that it can go either way. And so I do
understand, but that is the reason why I've chosen to follow this
path is just financially and I want it to be over with and done. I
mean, it's been drug out for a very long time.
THE COURT:
Okay. But when you use the phrase it's just a
flip of a coin as to what could happen, what I'm hearing you say is
that you agree that the jury very well could believe these children
that get up and testify.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
And if they did, the likelihood is that you would
by
the
jury. Do you understand that?
be found guilty
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
And so is that really - that risk, is that why
you're pleading guilty to this offense?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
(3/27/09 Tr., p.21, L.1 - p.23, L.12.)
The record supports the conclusion that the trial judge made sufficient
inquiry to determine there was a factual basis for the charge of injury to child as it
replaced the original charges of lewd conduct with a child and that Begley
entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily.

The record supports the district

court's conclusion that "after reviewing all the records in this case, this Court
finds that Begley entered his Alford Plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently."
(R., p.84.)

Begley has thus failed to show the court erred in concluding there
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was no genuine issue of material fact and dismissing Begley's claim that he plea
was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made.

II.

Begley Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In The Summary Dismissal
Without Requisite Notice In The Court's Notice Of Intent To Dismiss Of His
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim For Failing To Strike The Information
Regarding Uncharged Victims From Begley's Presentence Investigation Report

A.

Introduction
Begley asserts on appeal that "the district court erred when, without

providing notice of the reasons for dismissal, it summarily dismissed his claim
that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to, and move to strike from
the pre-sentence investigation report, information concerning three other minors
who had made unsubstantiated allegations of sexual abuse." (Appellant's brief,
pp.13-14.)

Because the underlying purpose of the notice requirement was

upheld in this matter, any error was harmless and Begley's argument fails.
B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App.
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact
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exists. Edwards v. Conchemco. Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280
(Ct. App. 1986).

C.

A Review Of The Record Shows That Any Lack Of Notice For The
Specific Basis Upon Which The Court Dismissed Begley's Claim That His
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Strike The Information Of Three
Uncharged Victims From Begley's Presentence Investigation Report Was
At Worst Harmless Error
Idaho Code § 19-4906 provides for the summary disposition of an

application for post-conviction relief upon motion by a party or on the court's own
initiative. Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 899, 908 P.2d 590, 592 (Ct. App.
1995).

"When the court considering the petition for post-conviction relief is

contemplating dismissal sua sponte, it must notify the parties of its intention to
dismiss and must provide its reasons for the potential dismissal." Banks v. State,
123 Idaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993) (citations omitted). When the state
files a motion for summary dismissal, setting forth adequate notice of the grounds
for dismissal, and the court grants the state's motion for the reasons urged by the
state, a post-conviction petitioner receives adequate notice of the grounds for
dismissal. Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App.
1986). The district court cannot, however, "dismiss a claim on a ground not
asserted by the state in its motion unless the court gives the twenty-day notice
required by Section 19-4906(b)." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 602, 200
P.3d 1148, 1151 (2009) (citing Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900
P.2d 795, 798 (1995)). The purpose of the 20-day notice requirement of I.C. §
19-4906(b) is to give the petitioner the opportunity to provide further legal
authority or evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact.
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Fetterly v.

State, 121 Idaho 417, 418, 825 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1991); State v. Christensen,
102 Idaho 487,489, 632 P.2d 676,678 (1981); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813,
818, 892 P.2d 488, 493 (Ct. App. 1995).
In his amended petition for post-conviction relief, Begley claimed his
counsel was ineffective for failing to represent his interests in the following ways:
a)
Failure to advise me that a psycho-sexual evaluation would
be part of the presentence investigation process.
b)
Failure to advise me of my rights not to participate in a
psycho-sexual evaluation and my right to consult with an attorney
prior to the evaluation process.
c)
Failure to discuss with me, and prepare me for, the psychosexual evaluation process.
d)
Prior to changing my plea, counsel failed to advise me what
was meant by a minimum of one (1) year sentence in this case.
e)
Counsel wrongfully advised me to change my plea from not
guilty to guilty.
Counsel failed to secure for me a plea agreement that was
binding not only upon the State but the Court as well.

f)

g)
Counsel failed to request a change of venue due to the
tremendous amount of pretrial publicity about my case.
h)
Counsel failed to call as witnesses during my sentencing
hearing Chip Morgan, polygrapher, and Dr. Johnson, the psychosexual evaluator, to present testimony in mitigation.
i)
Counsel failed to object to, and move to strike from the
presentence investigation report, information about three (3) other
minors who had made unsubstantiated allegations of sexual abuse
byme.
(R., pp.37-38.)

Begley filed a motion for summary disposition that addressed

only the voluntary nature of his plea, failing to address any of the remaining
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp.52-53, 60-76.)
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The district court filed an order denying Begley's motion for summary
dismissal and providing notice of its intent to dismiss Begley's petition for postconviction relief.

The court noted Begley alleged ineffective assistance of

counsel on the following grounds:
Begley was alleged he was told by [defense counsel] he would be
placed on probation and that the judge would grant him a withheld
judgment; Begley alleged that [defense counsel] did not inform him
that the Court would order a psycho-sexual evaluation which would
be used during his sentencing hearing; Begley alleged that
[defense counsel] did not attempt to seek a change of venue from
the Court because of media coverage; and Begley alleged that
[defense] counsel failed to adequately represent him by failing to
present Chip Morgan who conducted the polygraph test and Dr.
Johnson who performed the psycho-sexual evaluation at his
sentencing hearing.
(R., p.84.)

The court articulated the two prongs of the Strickland 2 test and

concluded, "Begley made these claims without any support, and did not brief the
issue. The court finds nothing in the record to find counsel's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness." (R., p.84.)
Begley filed a response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss again only
addressing the issue of the voluntariness of his guilty plea and failing to provide
any additional information in support of any of his claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. (See R., pp.87-91.) The court thereafter dismissed Begley's petition
for post-conviction relief on the grounds set forth in its notice of intent to dismiss.
(R., pp.92-94.)

The court's recitation of Begley's ineffective counsel claims omitted the
final allegation in Begley's amended petition for post-conviction relief, namely the

2

Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).
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allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to strike the information of the
three uncharged victims from the presentence investigation report. However,
Begley's appellate claim he did not understand his last allegation of ineffective
assistance of counsel was subject to dismissal is without merit

Read as a

whole, the district court gave notice that the entire claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, not just part of it, was subject to summary dismissal for failure to
support it with evidence.
Even if there was error, any error of notice is harmless because Begley
had an opportunity to respond to the court's determination that his claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel were unsupported and Begley failed to avail
himself of the opportunity.

"The notice procedure is necessary so that the

applicant is afforded an opportunity to respond and to establish a material issue
of fact if one exists." (Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 865, 243 P.3d 675, 681
(Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted). Although Begley filed a response to the court's
notice of intent to dismiss, he failed to address the claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel at all. Asserting at this stage that he was deprived of sufficient notice
that the court was dismissing all of the claim for a failure to support his claims of
ineffectiveness of counsel with admissible evidence is disingenuous where
Begley had the opportunity to provide additional evidence but completely failed to
address the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in favor of only supporting
his argument pertaining to the voluntariness of his guilty plea.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Begley's petition for post-conviction relief.
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